



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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O R 200637Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6293
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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CINCPAC: ALSO FOR POLAD

E. O. 12065: EOS 11/16/85 (TAYLOR, JAMES E.) OR-P
TAGS: OZOM, PINS, PINT, AP, UR
SUBJ: (LOU) AFGHANISTAN'S KHALQI REGIME AT 18 MONTHS: STILL IN
POWER, BUT FACING LONG-TERM INSTABILITY


1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

3. SUMMARY: EIGHTEEN MONTHS AFTER ITS "GREAT SAUR
REVOLUTION," THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN
(PDPA), NOW LED BY GENERAL SECRETARY HAPZZULLAH AMIN,
REMAINS IN POWER IN KABUL, A FACT WHICH PROBABLY REPRESENTS,
FROM THE KHALQI VIEWPOINT AT LEAST, THE REGIME'S SINGLE
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MOST IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT. OTHER SELF-PROCLAIMED SUCCESSES

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ARE LESS WELL-FOUNDED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DRA'S OPT-STATED FOREIGN POLICY GOAL TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH ITS "BROTHER" SOCIALIST COUNTRIES LED BY THE USSR. AT THE MOMENT, THE REGIME IS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY PREOCCUPIED WITH ITS FIGHT TO REMAIN IN POWER, AND APPEARS DETERMINED TO USE ALL AVAILABLE FORCE--DRAWING UPON SEEMINGLY LIMITLESS SOVIET SUPPLIES--TO SUBDUCE THE DOMESTIC INSURGENTIST.

3. THE BELEAGUERED REGIME HAS REACHED ITS CURRENT BIND BASICALLY THROUGH ITS OWN MISGUIDED POLICIES WHICH HAVE SERVED PRINCIPALLY TO EXACERBATE THE DIFFICULT, ALBEIT NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TASK OF ESTABLISHING A MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL. WHATEVER GOODWILL THE KHALQIS HAD AMONG THE AFGHAN MASSES IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE APR 27-28, 1978, REVOLUTION HAS BEEN LARGELY DISSIPATED, MAINLY AS A RESULT OF THE BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ALL PERCEIVED OPPOSITION, THE ENTHUSIASTIC STRENGTHENING OF THE AFGHAN-SOVIET BILATERAL TIE, AND THE REFUSAL TO ASSUAGE ADEQUATELY WIDESPREAD CONCERNS THAT THE KHALQI REGIME REPRESENTED A DISTINCT THREAT TO THE EXISTENCE OF ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN. THE ADOPTION OF THESE POLICIES, GENERALLY CONSIDERED UNNECESSARY AND SHORTSIGHTED, HAS LED TO A SITUATION IN WHICH AMIN'S REGIME ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY THE REVOLUTION, COULD GO UNDER IN ANY NUMBER OF WAYS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH WOULD BE AN ASSASSIN'S BULLET.

4. FOR HIS PART, THE GENERALLY HATED AND FEARED AFGHAN LEADER HAS FEW AVAILABLE WAYS OUT OF THE CURRENT MORASS, BUT HE APPEARS TO HAVE DECIDED TO PLACE MOST OF HIS MONEY ON THE MAILED FIST. SEVERAL RECENT DOMESTIC OLIVE BRANCHES ARE BEING CONSIDERED BY MOST OBSERVERS TO BE TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE, AND, THEREFORE, DOMESTIC INSTABILITY WILL PROBABLY
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BE A FACT OF AFGHAN POLITICAL LIFE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE ULTIMATE VICTIMS, OF COURSE, WILL BE THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WHO, FOR THE MOST PART, APPEARED CONTENT WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL WAY OF LIFE, AND WILL PROBABLY BE LONG-TERM OPPONENTS OF ANY REGIME ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE AN ALIEN AND HATED IDEOLOGY. REFORMISTS OF A DIFFERENT CHARACTER MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BRING ABOUT THE CHANGES ANNOUNCED BY THE KHALQIS WITHOUT CAUSING THE EXTENSIVE AND VIOLENT DISRUPTIONS OF THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. THE AMIN-LEO REGIME, HOWEVER, IS APPARENTLY DETERMINED TO PUSH AHEAD RELENTLESSLY

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IN ITS STRUGGLE FOR POWER, REGARDLESS OF THE ULTIMATE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COST TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. END OF SUMMARY.

5. THE REGIME'S SELF-PROCLAIMED ACHIEVEMENTS OVER THE 18 MONTH LIFETIME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA), A NUMBER OF BASIC PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN TRUMPETED AS RESOUNDING SUCCESSSES IN THIS REGIME'S EFFORT TO MOVE AFGHAN SOCIETY BEYOND THE ESSENTIALLY BIBLICAL AGE IN WHICH ITS EXISTS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. LAND REFORM, ELIMINATION OF THE USURIOUS BUSINESS PRACTICES WHICH PERMEATED THE VILLAGE ECONOMY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN, AND UNIVERSAL LITERACY ARE THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS WHICH THE REGIME CLAIMS IT HAS, TO VARYING DEGREES, SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED. "POLITICIZATION" OF THE MASSES WAS ALSO AN EARLY GOAL OF THE KHALQIS, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE PARTY CADRE, AS THE DRA LEADERSHIP APPEARED TO REALIZE THAT THE POLITICALLY ILLITERATE POPULATION--ESPECIALLY THE YOUTH--REPRESENTED A VAST UNTAPPED SOURCE OF SUPPORT, SINCE THE BULK OF THE REFORMS WERE DIRECTED AT IMPROVING THE LIVES OF THE "TOILING MASSES." CLAIMS THAT 98 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE SUPPORT THE REGIME ARE STILL DAILY FARE IN THE AFGHAN MEDIA. SINCE HIS SEPT 16 ELECTION AS "PRIMUS INTER PARES," HAFIZULLAH AMIN HAS PROCLAIMED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "SECURITY, LEGALITY, AND JUSTICE" AS THE HALLMARK OF HIS RULE. TO ACHIEVE THIS LOFTY--BY AFGHAN STANDARDS--OBJECTIVE, A MUCH BALLYHOODED
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CONSTITUTION IS BEING PENNED BY AN AMIN-SELECTED DRAFTING COMMISSION, AND, ACCORDING TO AMIN, WILL BE READY BY THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT SAUR REVOLUTION

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6294

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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6. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT, "ACTIVE NONALIGNMENT" HAS BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY PURSUED, ALTHOUGH THE DRA HAS CLEARLY ANNOUNCED THAT THIS POLICY IN NO WAY MEANS MAINTAINING NEUTRALITY OR EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO "SUPER-BLOCKS." THE PAST 18 MONTHS, THEREFORE, HAVE WITNESSED A SHARP DEPARTURE FROM THE NONALIGNMENT OF PAST AFGHAN REGIMES--ALTHOUGH THE DRA'S PREDECESSORS WERE UNDERSTANDABLY REQUIRED BY GEO-POLITICAL FACTORS TO "LEAN" TOWARD SOVIET POSITIONS ON VARIOUS ISSUES--TOWARD AFGHANISTAN'S "BROTHER" SOCIALIST COUNTRIES LED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THIS "PRINCIPLED POLICY" HAS BEEN HAILED BY THE DRA LEADERSHIP AS THE ONLY MEANS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL VILLAINS SUCH AS IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, AND RACISM.

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7. ...HAVE BEEN MAINLY ILLUSORY; DESPITE THE POSITIVE CLAIMS SET FORTH BY THE KHALOJ LEADERSHIP REGARDING THEIR

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SWEEPING DOMESTIC PROGRAMS. MOST EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THESE ANNOUNCED REFORMS HAVE FALLEN WELL SHORT OF THEIR INTENDED GOALS, AND, IN SOME CASES, HAVE ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE REGIME'S NOES. THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM DID REDISTRIBUTE SEVERAL MILLION HECTARES TO LESS THAN ONE-HALF MILLION PREVIOUSLY LANDLESS PEASANTS, BUT THE ABUSES USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH LARGE LANDHOLDINGS IN THIRD-WORLD COUNTRIES WERE NOT A MAJOR EVIL IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY AFGHANISTAN, AND MANY OBSERVERS CONTEND AT THIS POINT THAT THE DRA'S EFFORTS MAY HAVE CREATED AS MANY DOMESTIC ENEMIES AS IT DID SUPPORTERS. LIKEWISE, THE ABOLITION OF RURAL USURY--IN ITSELF COMMENDABLE--HAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY ALTERNATE MEANS OF RAISING CAPITAL FOR THE SMALL FARMER OR MERCHANT, AND THE REGIME AGAIN DISRUPTED ACCEPTED PRACTICES WHILE EXPERIENCING NO APPRECIABLE GAIN. EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN, AND UNIVERSAL LITERACY, ARE ALSO LAUDABLE GOALS, EXCEPT IN THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF AFGHAN MEN, WHOSE HEIGHTS OF MACHO CHAUVINISM EXCEED THE PEAKS OF THE HINDU KUSH.

8. ONLY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY FIELD CAN IT BE SAID WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE KHALQIS HAVE ESSENTIALLY ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECTIVE. AFGHANISTAN IS, INDEED, ACCURATELY CONSIDERED BY MOST AS A MEMBER OF THE RADICAL NONALIGNED MOVEMENT TYPIFIED BY CUBA, AND THE TRADITIONALLY CLOSE TIES WITH MOSCOW HAVE BECOME EXTENSIVE AND, IN THE EYES OF MANY, POTENTIALLY SMOTHERING. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM TO POLITICIZE THE MASSES--MOST OF THE POPA MEMBERSHIP WERE GENERALLY URBAN, YOUTHFUL, AND REASONABLY WELL EDUCATED BY AFGHAN STANDARDS--HAS NOT TURNED OUT EXACTLY AS PLANNED. THE MAJORITY OF VILLAGERS MAY WELL POSSESS AN ENHANCED POLITICAL AWARENESS AS A RESULT OF THE KHALQIS' CONFIDENTIAL
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VARIOUS PROGRAMS, BUT, UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE REGIME, THIS NEWLY-ACQUIRED "MASS ASSERTIVENESS" IS ESSENTIALLY AIMED AT OVERTHROWING THE DRA BY FORCE. THE URBAN YOUTH, HOWEVER, MAY BE A DIFFERENT STORY, ALTHOUGH THIS GROUP IS NUMERICALLY MUCH SMALLER THAN ITS RURAL COUNTERPART. EVENTS, AS WELL AS CONSCIOUS CHOICES, MAY REQUIRE THE KHALQIS TO FOCUS THEIR FUTURE EFFORTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON BUILDING A SOLID BASE OF SUPPORT WITHIN THE URBAN CENTERS.

9. ITS PROCLAIMED SUCCESSES NOTWITHSTANDING, THE REVOLUTIONARY AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF AT THIS POINT PRE-

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OCCUPIED WITH A STRUGGLE FOR ITS MERE EXISTENCE, UNABLE TO EXERT CONTROL OVER MUCH OF THE COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE MAJOR URBAN CENTERS, INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT UPON "THE RUSSIANS"--ALMOST EVERY AFGHANS' MOST HATED FOREIGNER--FOR THE MILITARY SUPPORT NECESSARY TO REMAIN IN POWER, BUT STILL UNWILLING TO EASE SIGNIFICANTLY ITS BRUTAL REPRESSION OF PERCEIVED DOMESTIC ENEMIES.

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O R 200627Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6205
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10. THE REGIME'S DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN PRINCIPALLY OF ITS OWN MAKING. THE MESSY SINO IN WHICH THE DRA FINDS ITSELF AFTER 18 TURBULENT MONTHS IN POWER CAN BE BASICALLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE KHALOIS' OWN MISGUIDED AND SOMETIMES HASTY POLICY DECISIONS, DESPITE THE GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED DIFFICULTY--BUT NOT NECESSARILY IMPOSSIBILITY--IN CREATING A MARXIST REGIME IN THE AFGHAN CONTEXT. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OF THE KHALOI REFORMS WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED RESISTANCE IN THIS TRADITIONAL SOCIETY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, MOST INFORMED OBSERVERS CONTEND THAT, ON THEIR OWN, THE VARIOUS REFORMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY ONEROUS THAT THEIR ADOPTION BY A REVOLUTIONARY REGIME WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DOMESTIC CONFLICT ON THE SCALE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY.

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11. THE KHALOIS' FUNDAMENTAL AND MOST GRIEVOUS MISTAKES HAVE BEEN THE UNRELENTING AND BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ALL PER-

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CEIVED OPPOSITION, THE HEADLONG RUSH TO CEMENT THE SOVIET CONNECTION BEYOND ANYTHING ADOPTED BY THE DRA'S PREDECESSORS, AND THE APPARENT REFUSAL TO FACE THE RELIGIOUS ISSUE UNTIL VERY RECENTLY (A RELATED CAMPAIGN WHICH MANY BELIEVE HAS COME TOO LATE TO BE CONVINCING OR EFFECTIVE). THESE VARIOUS POLICIES HAVE CREATED THE FOLLOWING "REALITIES" OF THE LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE:

--AN ATMOSPHERE OF MORTAL FEAR AND DREAD PERVADEING THE COUNTRY, AS VIRTUALLY EVERY AFGHAN (EVEN SOME "LOYAL KHALOIS") WONDERS IF TONIGHT IS HIS NIGHT TO FALL INTO THE CLUTCHES OF THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES, PERHAPS TO DISAPPEAR INTO ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S OVERCROWDED PRISONS, NEVER TO BE HEARD FROM AGAIN;

--A DECLINE -- SOMETIMES DRASTIC-- IN THE DRA'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, THE PRC, AND WITH AFGHANISTAN'S REGIONAL NEIGHBORS;

--THE ALIENATION OF THE COUNTRY'S EDUCATED MIDDLE CLASS (MANY OF WHOM ARE DESPERATELY TRYING TO FLEE THE COUNTRY) WHOSE TALENTS AND SKILLS COULD HAVE GREATLY HELPED THE KHALOIS CARRY OUT, RATHER THEN MERELY ANNOUNCE, MANY OF THEIR REFORMS;

--A WIDESPREAD HATRED OF AMIN, WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MODERATE, AND WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE THE PASSAGE OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN-GENERATION AND THE MATURATION OF A GENUINE "KHALOI" GENERATION (ASSUMING AMIN SURVIVES THAT LONG; ADMITTEDLY AN ACTUARIAL LONGSHOT);

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--AN "ANTI-RUSSIANISM" OFTEN FLARING INTO EXTREME VIOLENCE, WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT BEEN PARALLELED HERE SINCE THE "NO QUARTER" FIGHTING SURROUNDING THE BRITISH RETREAT FROM KABUL IN 1842;

--A FERVENT ANTI-KHALOI "HIJAD" (HOLY WAR) WAGED BY THOUSANDS OF VILLAGERS WHO BELIEVE THEIR RELIGION SO THREATENED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN WILLING TO CONFRONT MODERN MILITARY FIREPOWER WITH LITTLE MORE THAN WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM THE GOVERNMENT, OR WITH THE PRODUCT OF PAKISTAN'S

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NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE'S MOST FAMOUS COTTAGE INDUSTRY:

--FINALLY, INTERCINE SCHISMS, HATREDS, CRUIDETS, AND 'SCORES TO SETTLE' WHICH HAVE SO DEEPLY RENT THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FABRIC OF THE COUNTRY THAT VIOLENT INSTABILITY WILL PROBABLY REMAIN A FACT OF LIFE HERE FOR YEARS TO COME.

12. WHAT MAKES ALL OF THIS SO TRAGIC IS THAT IT WAS PROBABLY UNNECESSARY AND CERTAINLY NOT INEVITABLE. FOR A FEW MONTHS, AT LEAST, FOLLOWING THE 1978 REVOLUTION, MOST AFGHANS--RURAL AS WELL AS URBAN DWELLERS-- AND MOST FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (INCLUDING THE USG) WERE CLEARLY WILLING TO GIVE THE KHALQIS THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT AND SEE WHAT THEIR POLICIES WOULD BE. ALTHOUGH THE KHALQIS WERE NOT UNIVERSALLY WELCOMED WITHIN THE COUNTRY, DAQUD'S DENISE WAS NOT OVERLY HONORED, AND IN THE AFGHAN TRADITION MOST WERE READY TO TOLERATE ANY TYPE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS THAT GOVERNMENT STUCK TO ITS OWN TUNE AND POSED NO THREAT TO THE TIME-HONORED AFGHAN WAY OF LIFE. THE THOUSANDS OF IMPRISONED INTELLIGENTSIA AND MIDDLE CLASS DID NOT REPRESENT ANY VIALBE THREAT TO THE KHALQIS' THEN DISCIPLINED ARMED AND AIR FORCE UNITS. MANY OF THE HIGHLY PUBLICIZED BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED JUST AFTER THE APR 1978, REVOLUTION STEMMED FROM NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE DAQUD REGIME, AND THE KHALQIS' DECISION TO
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TRUMPET THIS 'NEW TIE' GAINED THEMSELVES LITTLE BUT ANIMOSITY FOR EMBARKING ON A 'SELL-OUT' OF THE COUNTRY TO MOSCOW, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT. WE PRESUME THAT THE DRA LEADERSHIP PERCEIVED THAT THEY HAD A PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM VIS-A-VIS ISLAM, YET THEY HAVE MADE NO SERIOUS EFFORT UNTIL RECENTLY TO CALM THE WORRIES AMONG THE GENERAL POPULACE REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THEIR RELIGION, AND, IN FACT, HAVE EXACERBATED THESE WORRIES BY RELEASING A TONNENT OF PURE MARXIST RHETORIC WHICH SERVED TO CONFIRM THE COMMON VIEW THAT ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN WAS DESTINED FOR THE SAME FATE AS ISLAM IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA.

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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13. THE KHALAIS THEMSELVES, THEREFORE, MUST GENERALLY BEAR THE BURDEN OF BLAME FOR THE RELATIVELY QUICK AND COMPLETE END OF THE DRA'S HONEYMOON WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, AND THE CREATION OF THE CURRENT INSTABILITY WHICH THREATENS TO IMPINGE UPON THE REGIONAL INTERESTS OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES. WHETHER AMIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES CAN SAVE THE SITUATION FOR THE REVOLUTION REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT GIVEN THEIR TRACK RECORD, WISE AND CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DECISIONS HAVE NOT BEEN THE KHALAIS' STRONGEST SUIT.

14. AMIN REGIME COULD GO UNDER IN A NUMBER OF WAYS:
THE "OK CORRAL"-STYLE SHOOTOUT OF SEPT 14 IN KABUL'S
"HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE" ILLUSTRATES THE VOLATILITY, UNPREDIC-
TABILITY, AND HIGH STAKES CHARACTERISTIC OF PRESENT-DAY
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AFGHAN POLITICS, AND UNDERSCORES THE POSSIBILITY THAT
AMIN COULD "INVOLUNTARILY" DEPART THE SCENE AT LITERALLY

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ANY MOMENT. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT IN OUR MINDS THAT MANY PERSONS ARE HOPING FOR THE CHANGE TO GUN HIM DOWN, AN EVENT WHICH COULD WELL EXACERBATE DOMESTIC INSTABILITY, BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE REVOLUTION. A VIOLENT AMIN DENISE WOULD, INCIDENTALLY, BE IN KEEPING WITH AFGHAN "TRADITION," BECAUSE, SINCE THE NATURAL DEATH OF AMIR ABDUR RAHMAN IN 1901, NO AFGHAN LEADER (INCLUDING, OF COURSE, THE LATE TARAKI) HAS LEFT THE SCENE WILLINGLY AND/OR PEACEFULLY.

15. ASIDE FROM ASSASSINATION, THERE ARE OTHER DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE END OF AMIN'S REGIME, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO FIRM EVIDENCE THAT THESE ARE, AT THE MOMENT, IMMINENT. MULTI-FACETED AND EXTENSIVE SOVIET SUPPORT HAS BECOME ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL FOR THE AMIN REGIME, AS WELL AS FOR THE REVOLUTION, AND ANY DECISION BY MOSCOW TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY OR TO WITHOLD THIS SUPPORT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE AFGHAN GAME WAS NOT WORTH THE CANDOL WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REPRESENT AMIN'S AND THE KHALQIS' DEATH KNEEL. FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED TO CONTINUE BACKING THE AMIN TEAM, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD WELL REPRESENT ONLY A SHORT-TERM COMMITMENT. HOWEVER, MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR THE REVOLUTION APPEARS TO BE MORE SOLID AND LONGER-TERM.

16. A COLLAPSE OF THE REGIME'S HARD-PRESSED ARMY COULD ALSO RESULT IN THE END OF AMIN AND THE ADVENT OF DOMESTIC CHAOS, BUT CERTAIN UNITS MIGHT BE ABLE TO RALLY AND SAVE THE REVOLUTION.

THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE A SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, AND COULD BE FOREHADOWED BY INCREASED DEFECTIONS AND DEERTIONS ON THE PART OF UNITS ENGAGED

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IN PROSECURING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY FIGHT. IN THIS REGARD, DESPITE THE IMMENSE PRESSURES ON THE AFGHAN ARMY IN THE FIELD, THE RECENT "OFFENSIVE" IN PAKIA PROVINCE APPARENTLY WAS CARRIED OUT IN A RELATIVELY PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS PERFORMANCE COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PLANNING AND LEADERSHIP PROVIDED BY SOVIET ADVISORS, RATHER THAN TO ANY GROWING EFFICIENCY ON THE PART OF THE RURITANTAN-STYLE AFGHAN ARMY. IN ANY CASE, THE REGIME STILL APPEARS TO COMMAND THE LOYALTY OF SEGMENTS OF THE KEY ARMORED AND AIR FORCE UNITS STATIONED IN AND AROUND KABUL, THE POLITICAL HEART OF THE COUNTRY.

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17. THE MOST PALPABLE THREAT TO AMIN'S LEADERSHIP PROBABLY STEMS FROM POSSIBLE FURTHER SPLITS AND FIGHTS WITHIN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY HIERARCHY WHICH APPEARS TO BE COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE STRUGGLE TO REMAIN IN POWER. AMIN IS CLEARLY VIEWED BY MOST AFGHANS AS THE ARCH VILLAIN IN THE CURRENT DRAMA, AND WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT FACTIONS EXIST WITHIN THE PARTY AND THE MILITARY WHO ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO HIS HANDLING OF AFFAIRS OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS, AND WHO MAY DECIDE THAT HIS DEPARTURE REPRESENTS THE ONLY HOPE FOR MAINTAINING THE CONCEPT OF A REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN KABUL. WHEN, HOW, AND AROUND WHOM THESE FACTIONS MIGHT COALESCE AND TAKE ACTION REMAINS UNKNOWN, HOWEVER, BUT THE OCT 14-15 MUTINY AT THE KISHKOR ARMY BASE SOUTH OF KABUL COULD REPRESENT A MANIFESTATION OF THIS TYPE OF ANTI-AMIN CONVICTION. INHERENT IN THIS PARTICULAR SCENARIO, OF COURSE, IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT AMIN AND/OR HIS CLOSEST COLLEAGUES WILL SIMPLY CRACK UNDER THE PRESSURE OF THE NEXT MUTINY, AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, OR OTHER CRISIS, AND WILL IN PANIC TAKE STEPS THAT LEAD DIRECTLY TO THEIR OWN DENISE. TO DATE, HOWEVER, THE KHALOIS HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY RESILIENT IN DEALING WITH THESE VARIOUS POLITICAL "SPIKES" WHICH HAVE BROKEN OUT WITHIN OR ADJACENT TO THE SEAT OF POWER, AND WE CONTINUE TO BE AMAZED AT THE APPARENT APLOMB WITH WHICH AMIN AND THE OTHER KHALOI LEADERS WEATHERED

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THE SEPT 14 SHOOTOUT. THEY APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT WHOLESALE GUNFIGHTS ARE AN ACCEPTABLE WAY TO SETTLE POLITICAL DISPUTES, AND IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY ARE PROBABLY CORRECT.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 AOS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 NSCZ-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 PM-06 H-01
INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 AID-05 IO-14
TRSE-00 CMB-01 EB-08 ACDA-12 HA-05 SY-05 /122 W
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6297

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BEIJING

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

CINCPAC

UNMISSION US NATO

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16. FORMIDABLE DILEMMAS FACE THE REGIME: IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY OF THE FATES DESCRIBED ABOVE, AMIN HAS RELATIVELY FEW ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO HIM. HE APPEARS TO HAVE ELECTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW--ACCEPTING THE POLITICAL STRINGS ATTACHED (E.G. TRYING TO ESTABLISH A MORE HUMANE APPEARANCE FOR HIS REGIME), AND TO USE THIS LIMITLESS SUPPLY LINE TO INCREASE THE APPLICATION OF BRUTE FORCE AGAINST THE INSURGENTS. THIS POLICY COULD, OF COURSE "SUCCEED" IN THE SHORT RUN AS MORE AND MORE VILLAGES ARE WIPE OUT, FAMILIES ELIMINATED, CROPS DESTROYED, AND REFUGEES FOR PAKISTAN CREATED. IN THE LONGER RUN, HOWEVER, THIS PARTICULAR APPROACH WILL ALSO SERVE TO FEED THE OPPOSITION OF THE TOUGH, INDEPENDENT AFGHAN PEOPLE, AND WILL DEEPEN THE HATREDS AND ANTIOSITIES DIRECTED AT THE KHALOIS
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AND THEIR SOVIET MENTORS. NEVERTHELESS, ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL COURSE OF

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ACTION AMIN AMIN WILL PURSUE, WITH ALL THE INHERENT AND NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY.

19. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, AMIN HAS BEGUN TO MAKE SOOTHING REMARKS REGARDING THE FUTURE STATUS OF ISLAM IN THE DRA, AND HAS LAUNCHED A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CAMPAIGN TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS (IMPLICITLY VITIMIZED BY HIS PREDECESSOR). WE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ONLY A FEW PERSONS RELEASED, SO FAR. AS HAS BEEN THE GENERAL BELIEF SINCE THE REVOLUTION, THESE PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS APPEAR TO HAVE REPRESENTED NO CONCEIVABLE THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT'S EXISTENCE. AMIN'S NIRVANA OF "SECURITY, LEGALITY, AND JUSTICE" WILL ALLEGEDLY BE GUARANTEED BY THE NEW CONSTITUTION BEING DRAFTED BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY HIM. THESE VARIOUS OLOVE BRANCHES HAVE PROBABLY COME TOO LATE, HOWEVER, SINCE MOST AFGHANS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT AMIN PERSONALLY IS THE REASON "SECURITY, LEGALITY AND JUSTICE" DO NOT, AND WILL NOT--HIS CONSTITUTION NOTWITHSTANDING--EXIST UNDER AN AMIN-LED REGIME.

20. NONETHELESS, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, TIME COULD WELL BE ON THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY IF THE SOVIET PIPELINE REMAINS SUFFICIENTLY OPEN TO ENABLE THE KHALOIS TO BLOODSTON THE COUNTRYSIDE INTO SOME SEMBLANCE OF "TRANQUILITY." THE DRA MIGHT THEN HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO RECRUIT WIDER SUPPORT AMONG THE AFGHAN YOUTH IN ORDER TO MEET THE REGIME'S NEEDS FOR DEDICATED AND LOYAL PARTY AND MILITARY CADRE.

21. CONCLUSIONS: WHATEVER THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME OF THE
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CURRENT STRUGGLE, WHAT SEEMS INCREASINGLY CLEAR IS THAT THE CLOCK PROBABLY CAN NEVER BE TURNED BACK TO THE POINT WHERE A DAVID-STYLE REGIME--OR EVEN ONE A BIT MORE LEFTIST WITH SOME REMAINING REVOLUTIONARY TRAPPINGS--COULD, IN REASONABLE SECURITY, RULE IN KABUL, PURSUING MODEST SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAMS, BUT RETAINING INTACT THE FABRIC OF TRADITIONAL AFGHAN SOCIETY. EVEN WITH THE TEMPORARY SUBJUGATION OF THE INSURGENTS THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF MASSIVE MILITARY FORCE, ANIMOSITIES ARE BY NOW SO DEEP THAT LONG-TERM DOMESTIC AND PERHAPS REGIONAL INSTABILITY IS PROBABLY A CERTAINTY. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AN INSURGENT "VICTORY"

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WOULD BRING ABOUT ITS OWN BRAND OF INSTABILITY AND BLOODSHED, AND WOULD PROBABLY BE MARKED BY ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL DISRUPTIONS AND ANARCHY FOR YEARS TO COME. THUS, THE ULTIMATE VICTIMS OF THE ONGOING STRUGGLE WILL BE THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, WHO, FOR BETTER OR WORSE, SOMEHOW HAVE ALWAYS APPEARED REASONABLY CONTENT WITH THEIR SIB-LOCAL-ASS EXISTENCE, AND WHO WILL, THEREFORE, BE THORNY SUBJECTS FOR ANY REGIME ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE A GOVERNMENT BASED ON A FOMENTED AND HATED IDEOLOGY. REFORMISTS OF A DIFFERENT CHARACTER MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PULL OFF THE CHANGES THIS SOCIETY NEEDS WITHOUT PROVOKING THE TRAUMAS WHICH WILL REMAIN FOR SO LONG. THE ISALOTS, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY WITH AMIN AT THE HELM ARE NOT CUT FROM THIS CLOTH, AND ARE APPARENTLY DETERMINED TO PUSH AHEAD IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR POWER REGARDLESS OF THE HUMAN AND ECONOMIC COST TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

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